2 Encoding neoliberal reciprocity

Connecting patient, government and society

In Part 1, I indicated the importance of neoliberalism for understanding Dutch healthcare innovation. In this chapter, I continue this line of the discussion. With respect to the practical ‘lens’ of this chapter, this denotes a study of neoliberal elements in the planning of an infrastructure for a Dutch electronic health record. We will see that similar mechanisms are at work as what I showed for the tools to measure innovation.

Theoretically, I start the discussion of the second ‘mode of subjectivation’ that is central to Part 2 of the study: re-establishing power relations in society. An understanding of the manner in which neoliberalism attempts to re-create such relations is essential for grasping subjectivation in postpanopticism. I pose that neoliberalism is a type of postpanoptical political and economic thought. In the previous chapter I already indicated that ‘staged freedom’ is central to such a way of thinking. In this chapter, I develop this notion.

The framework for this chapter is based on the scattered remarks that Foucault made about reciprocity in a neoliberal context. I am particularly interested in the manner in which ideas about reciprocity are used in creating ‘blueprints’ for a new governmentality. I use this concept to indicate that I refer to the policy planning stage here. Just like in Foucault’s work on neoliberalism, the focus is on conceptualisation, rather than on implementation. However, by connecting the notion of blueprints to the design of technology – the electronic health record – I study attempts to make the conceptualisation ‘durable’, to use Latour’s term again. In terms of the title: I study attempts to ‘encode’ neoliberal perceptions of reciprocity in the technical infrastructure of the electronic health record. In this chapter, I mainly rely on documents that have ‘passed through parliament’. In following chapters, I broaden this scope.

With respect to the broader understanding of postpanopticism, my argument here is that attempts are made to use new types of information technology to enforce a governmentality that is different than panopticism. In this respect, technological developments are intertwined with the shift from one type of governmentality to another. This is not to say that a different orientation in political thought caused the development of different technologies,
or the other way around. Such shifts typically co-occur. In the next chapter, I will be able to come back to the impact of such long-term developments. We also have to be careful not to imagine such shifts as ‘breaks’.

Caution is warranted here. The idea of materialising human conceptions evokes the subject-object dichotomy that thinkers like Latour have rightfully resisted. It recalls much-criticised social determinist views of technology, or views of materialised discourse. This is particularly the reason for stressing the notion of blueprints: these necessarily have the status of plans. In the following chapters, these attempts at human construction are questioned step by step. Another cautionary note is that there is a danger in focusing on technology as an infrastructure (Barry, 2001). It quite easily evokes a Marxist image of a technological base on which ‘social’ superstructures are built. I do not share such a view of technology. Nevertheless, such an approach does seem to underpin political discussions to a great extent. As such, it would be a shame to ignore it. Also here, the logic is that I focus on attempts to create infrastructures. In later chapters, I question the feasibility of such attempts, in relation to subjectivation.

Reciprocity is a central topic in social theory, and is typically hard to define (Gouldner, 1960). It is not my aim to define it here, even though a few ‘minimal’ comments are necessarily to place the following into context. A long history of research has shown that it is dangerous to simply regard a reciprocal exchange as a set of mutually beneficial acts of generosity. Particularly the anthropological study of gift-exchange has brought forward that in some societies ‘a present is a misfortune because, in the final analysis, it must be reciprocated’ (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 94). On the other hand, it is particularly this notion that makes the perception of value of great importance in the understanding of reciprocity. In order to know how to reciprocate, in such a society, the value of the present has to be assessed rather precisely. In this sense, an exchange is only reciprocal if it is mutually appreciated as reasonable.

In this chapter, I follow Michel Foucault’s account of the history of the reciprocity concept in political thought. This is interesting for different reasons. Theoretically, reciprocity is hardly recognised as a theme in Foucault’s work, probably because he deals with it somewhat implicitly. Only with regard to his dismissal of humanism we can find some discussion. Hooke (1987), for instance, argues that Foucault maintains basic human values, such as reciprocity, while rejecting modern humanism. He furthermore states that:
Foucault does more than mention the theme of reciprocity. He is often critical when it is distorted because individuals are placed in circumstances whereby their chances of understanding what is happening to them or choosing their actions within the circumstances are decreased’ (1987, p. 41).

I agree with such a point of view, and argue that reciprocity is generally important in Foucault’s work. It sheds light on how reciprocity is constituted within a network, or ‘topology’ of power relations (Collier, 2009). As with most of Foucault’s analyses, such an approach can serve as a ‘counter history’ to the humanist reading of modernity that he opposes.

Practically, Foucault’s ideas on reciprocity are relevant as a reflection on recent policy developments, particularly neoliberalism. He juxtaposes mid-20th century forms of neoliberalism – mainly German Ordoliberalism and the American Chicago School – to the classical liberalism of the 17th and 18th century (Gane, 2008). Nevertheless, there is clearly a great continuity of earlier liberal thought. This is easily overlooked. Despite a few points of criticism (Tribe, 2009), or remarks about omitted parts of relevance (Lazzarato, 2009), the reception by economists of Foucault’s work in this area seems to be generally positive.

From the point of view of reciprocity, it is particularly interesting that Foucault argues that neoliberalism abandoned the notion of ‘exchange’ as the central denominator of economic thought. In The Order of things (Foucault, 2002), which I referred to in the previous chapter, the importance of exchange in modern thought is explained in relation to the question of labour. In neoliberalism, competition became the new paradigm. An important question for this chapter is how reciprocity is conceptualised if the focus on exchange is abandoned.

The approach of this chapter is to provide a more systematic account of a topic that Foucault deals with somewhat implicitly. I do this by distinguishing four forms of reciprocity: between individuals, between individuals and the population – in ‘civil society’ – between civil society and government and between individuals and government. These four types are subsequently applied to the planning of the infrastructure for a Dutch electronic health record. Concretely, this implies that I study how attempts are made to translate a particular conception of reciprocity into a script that the record would carry out. Such an approach of studying the inscription of values, interests or visions has some history in the study of electronic health records (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1997). Clearly, the same cautionary remark applies here: human
inscriptions often fail. This, however, is the topic of Part 3. Throughout my discussion, I relate reciprocity to the question of the ‘neoliberal subject’ that Foucault evokes (Read, 2009) and make the connection with the two subject-types that I discussed in the previous chapter.

Towards a neoliberal view of reciprocity

A crucial point for understanding changes in the political understanding of reciprocity, according to Foucault, is when political scholars ceased to think in terms of a social contract, as developed by thinkers like Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in the 17th and 18th century. Depending on which contract theorists were followed, this implied a voluntary agreement based on the will of individuals to constitute a society or a sovereign ruler. It has been recognised that the notion of the social contract played a fundamental role in Foucault’s thinking about reciprocity. Hooke argues that:

‘[w]e need to understand how Foucault sees humanism participating in the rupture of possible reciprocal relations among humans. Fundamental to Foucault’s view is seeing that what is distinctive in humanism’s interpretation of the human values is the mediation of the social contract’ (1987, p. 42).

It was the social contract that changed both the ideas about the relations between individuals, between individuals and the population, and between ‘civil society’ and government. The idea of this mediation is that reciprocity does not only exist between individuals, but also between individuals and society. While crime, for instance, was previously considered as an attack against the sovereign, with the introduction of the social contract construct it was conceptualised as an attack against society and all its members. In other words, an institutionalised form of reciprocity was assumed between individuals and society. In what follows, I show that Foucault noted that one of the most fundamental innovations of neoliberalism was to abandon the notion of a social contract.

I explain how we can understand both the continuity and discontinuity in the development from social contract theory to classical liberalism and neoliberalism. As said, I subdivide this by looking at developments in thinking about a number of different relations of reciprocity. Sometimes, however,
these different types are interrelated. This particularly relates to the involvement of government. I note when this is the case.

**Reciprocity between individuals**

The first transition from contract thinking to neoliberalism is that reciprocity was no longer thought of as being grounded in law, but as being driven by interest. An early debate on liberal views of contract-theory dealt with the question of why individuals would be inclined to respect a contract once it was instated. Even though there was general agreement that individuals enter the contract because of their personal interests, there was a difference of opinion on respecting it afterwards. Foucault refers to Blackstone’s argument of respecting the contract for the sake of it being a contract, and mentions Hume’s argument of respecting the contract because of the interest in maintaining the level of security that it offers (2008, p. 273). Foucault explains this distinction by pointing at the different model of man that this implies: the former being a ‘subject of right’ (*homo juridicus*) and the latter being a ‘subject of interest’ (*homo economicus*). The subject of interest could break the contract if it was no longer in his or her interest. This is clearly a more liberal view of contract theory, but one that pertains to a classical form of liberalism. Later forms, including neoliberalism, reject social contract theory altogether. Obviously, this does not imply that there are no contracts or other forms of juridical agreements in neoliberalism. Abandoning social contract theory effectively implies that the idea of a purposeful bond between individuals is replaced by an implicit one, which is the unintended outcome of the interplay of individual interests. This structure is essentially egoistic (McNay, 2009), but is still considered reciprocal.

Another development that has probably been important in terms of idea about reciprocity is the historical development in thinking about the central organising principle of economic life. Over time, this shifted from ‘exchange’ to ‘competition’. This does not imply that there was no competition in the ‘exchange era’, and vice versa. It is rather that the way of thinking about these concepts changed over time. Foucault, however, contradicts himself when discussing the time at which this shift occurred. On the one hand, he refers to the competition paradigm as one of the three defining characteristic that sets neoliberalism apart from classical liberalism (2008, p. 118). On the other hand, he particularly traces back these changing perceptions to classical economists like Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. It seems to me that the
correct interpretation is that the principle was developed around the mid-18th century, but that it would develop into an omnipresent paradigm only later. This is to a great extent due to connecting the theme of competition to entrepreneurship. The German incarnation of this way of thinking was to regard the family as the ideal small-scale entrepreneurial unit. This conception is largely due to its links to Christian politics. The American form, by contrast, believed the individual to be an ‘entrepreneur of the self’. This implies an outlook at all aspects of one’s life, as if it were an entrepreneurial venture. One’s education, one’s relations require a form of management similar to that of a business enterprise. This strongly echoes the theory of investing in human capital, which I explained in the previous chapter. Good education for one’s children becomes an investment, which will lead to future pay-offs.

Then, what does this changed perception of competition imply? Up to mid 18th, the influence of mercantilism implied a way of thinking that entailed that ‘competition [could] only be conceived in the form of a zero sum game and so of the enrichment of some at the expense of others’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 53). After that, a way of thinking was introduced that made competition compatible with the idea of reciprocity. Foucault argues that:

‘for the physiocrats, but also for Adam Smith, the freedom of the market can and must function in such a way that what they call the natural price or the good price will be established through and thanks to this freedom. [This] will be profitable to the seller, but also to the buyer’ (2008, p. 53).

What we see here is a way of thinking in which reciprocity is no longer based on the object that was exchanged, as in the examples of gift exchange that I noted in the introduction. Instead, it is based on the way in which the relation of exchange is shaped by competition.

In liberal thought that preceded neoliberalism, it was acknowledged that the focus on self-interestedness would collide with other values that a person may have, such as feelings of benevolence for others. There was still a distinction between the economic subject and the ‘individual’. For neoliberal thinkers, however, particularly for an economist like Gary Becker, this distinction disappeared. Even interpersonal values could be explained in an economic manner. For instance, in his discussion of the ‘economics of marriage’ he argued that the reciprocal relations between husband and wife may well be explained on the exclusive basis of the principles of self-interestedness and rationality (Becker, 1976).
Reciprocity between individuals and the population

Foucault relates the rise of the population as an unit of governance to the development of statistics and political economy around the half of the 18th century (Foucault, 1991). He defines population as a ‘group of beings living in a given area’ (Foucault, 1979, p. 252). In the model that was to replace the traditional conception of sovereignty and its ‘art of government’, the welfare of the population became the highest end, which was to be achieved by means of political science. Some have argued that Foucault approaches populations more and more through its individual elements (Tellmann, 2009). However, when it comes to generating knowledge in relation to the building of power, the individual and the population get separate attention. He distinguishes knowledge that is ‘globalizing and quantitative’ when the population is concerned and an ‘analytical’ type of knowledge of individuals (Foucault, 1982).

In order to understand how individuals relate to the larger whole of the population, or community, Foucault describes the ideas of different authors on ‘civil society’. Contrary to contemporary civil society scholars, Foucault stresses the way in which early thinkers regarded civil society as the ‘playground’ of economic relations. He explains how this concept changed meanings over time. Up to the mid-18th century, it was connected to the juridical setup that I outlined before, for thinkers like John Locke, for example. Afterwards, authors like Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith regarded it as an aggregate concept that fixed the spontaneous relations between individuals and the population. Adam Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ is probably the best known description of this way of thinking. Rather than relying on formal agreements, there would be a ‘spontaneous synthesis’, or a ‘de facto economic bond between men’ (McNay, 2009, p. 69) in society as a result of the interplay of individual and collective interests. The assumption is that the natural development of power relations ‘plays the spontaneous role of the social contract’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 303). He continues by saying that:

‘there is no need of a pactum unionis to join individuals together in civil society, so for political power to emerge and function within civil society there is no need of a pactum subjectionis, of the surrender of certain rights and the acceptance of someone else’s sovereignty. There is a spontaneous synthesis of power. How does this come about? It is brought about quite simply by a de facto bond which links different concrete individuals to each other’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 303).
As I said before, there was a belief in an automatic forming of competitive, but reciprocal relations by which individuals would find their position in civil society. This reciprocity, however, would extend beyond the relation between individuals. Foucault stresses that there is an assumption of

‘reciprocity between the whole and its components [...] We cannot imagine or conceive an individual to be happy if the whole to which he belongs is not happy. Better, we cannot even assess exactly an individual’s quality, value, and virtue [...] unless we think of it on the basis of the place he occupies, the role he performs, and the effects he produces within the whole. Every element of civil society is assessed by the good it will produce or bring about for the whole. We can say that a man is good, that he is fine only insofar as he is right for the place he occupies and, Ferguson says, ‘produce the effect it must produce,’ But conversely, the value of the whole is not an absolute and is not to be attributed to the whole and only the whole, but to each member of this whole: ‘it is likewise true, that the happiness of individuals is the great end of civil society’ (2008, p. 301).

We see a way of framing that is very similar to one of the two subjectivations that I discussed in the previous chapter: the ‘human capital subject’. However, by reconceptualising it in the framework of a relation of reciprocity, the image changes to some extent. Suddenly, there is a rationale for why people should accept their role as cog in the wheel of the economy: the idea that civil society treats them well in return. Nevertheless, we have to note that it is hardly clear how this is expected to work in practice. We have to keep the option of rhetoric open.

To a great extent, this way of thinking was adopted in neoliberalism as well. The difference is mainly that the assumption that power relations and reciprocity would occur spontaneously was dropped. This, however, relates to yet another way of thinking about reciprocity, i.e. in the relation between government and civil society. I return to that below. First, I attempt to finish my discussion of reciprocity between individual and population.

If all conduct is exclusively based on individual interest, as is imagined by several neoliberal thinkers, then collective goods must never be an objective for individual citizens. These are left to the State. As a result of this, collective values are said to have been lost in neoliberalism (McNay, 2009). Still,
it is assumed that by pursuing their own interests, individuals unintentionally create benefits for society as well. Reciprocity takes an implicit form. This is a rather awkward notion, particularly considering the description that I gave of reciprocity in the introduction to this chapter. If reciprocity is so implicit, it cannot really be assessed by individuals anymore, as was the case in the example of gift exchange. Obviously, we can imagine speaking in general terms about the mutual benefits that individuals and society receive in their engagements. However, if we follow such a calculative mode of thinking, for both parties it is hard to decide whether their benefits seem to be in balance.

The final development I want to highlight here is that neoliberal thinkers claim that bonds between individuals and collectives are mediated by the rules of an economic game. This is largely intertwined with the development of game theory, which developed in close proximity to neoliberalism. Think tanks like the RAND corporation had a substantial impact on this (Amadae, 2003). More in general, it is connected to the adoption of rational choice theory, which could be applied to anything in the wide range from crime, to wages in the workplace and married life, as I said before. The importance of this is that in both contract theory and in the neoliberal conception of reciprocity there is a notion of rules that govern the relation. In the case of the social contract, however, these are rules that were imagined to have been purposefully set between individuals. In the neoliberal conception, by contrast, the rules of the game are external to civil society. In classical liberalism, it was still expected that such rules were given by nature, recalling the faith in a spontaneous synthesis. For neoliberals, it is the state that needs to set the rules of the game.

Reciprocity between government and civil society

The shift from reciprocity based on a juridical agreement to one based on interests also impacted the thinking about the relation between government and civil society. Foucault’s description of the development in ideas on what he calls the ‘internal limitation of government’ clearly captures this phenomenon. In the era of juridical conceptions of government, states were considered to be limited by extrinsic laws – both natural and positive ones – in their sphere of influence. There were certain areas in which no influence could be exerted. The particular theory of the social contract even assumed that such laws were formed in agreement between the population and government. The reciprocal relation that is implied here is that citizens transfer
some of their rights to government, in order to receive the protection of these and other rights in return.

With the abandonment of such juridical ways of thinking, in favour of ones characterised by interest, the thought arose that governments ought to be limited intrinsically, rather than by an outside source. This development coincided with the rise of utilitarianism. It led to think that the welfare, condition, longevity and health of the population ought to be the main objective of government. Governmental actions had to be justified by means of ‘the utility of individuals and the general utility’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 44). Foucault claims that this principle has turned into an all‐compassing element of our age, replacing the notion of natural rights of citizens. The internal limitation of government in this framework means that governmental action is only thought to be justifiable from a utilitarian perspective. Foucault connects this to the rise of political economy, which created models to ‘measure’ the functioning of government. The reciprocal relation in this respect changes into allowing government to exert power as long as it is in the interest of the population and its citizens. In order to understand how government and civil society can ‘assess’ the reciprocity of such a relation, we need to understand the relation between government and individual first. This is discussed under the following heading.

The coming of neoliberalism, finally, implied that the notion of the state and the economy as separate domains was completely annulled. Foucault argues that:

‘There will not be the market game, which must be left free, and then the domain in which the state begins to intervene, since the market, or rather pure competition, which is the essence of the market, can only appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 121).

This provides a good link to the last form of reciprocity that I discuss here: that between government and individual.

Reciprocity between government and individual

What we see appear here, is the constitution of an active, disciplinary subject. This is exactly in line with what I described in the previous chapter: one of the ways in which innovation policy subjectivates care recipients, is by making them monitor the conduct of physicians. An important question in the
line of the discussion that I have added in this chapter is why people would accept such a role.

In contrast to Foucault’s work on panopticism, he focuses less on centralised forms of subjection. In a lecture in 1980 at Dartmouth College, not long after the lectures that I refer to here mainly, he remarked that: ‘When I was studying asylums, prisons, and so on, I insisted, I think, too much on the techniques of domination’ (Foucault, 1993, p. 204). Instead, he became aware of the relevance of practices of the self. In the 1980 lecture, he argued that, in contrast to such earlier work on domination-centred government, he would like to ‘study government [...] starting from the techniques of the self’ (1993, p. 204). His lectures that constitute The Birth of Biopolitics may be regarded as a first step in this direction. Foucault argues here, albeit somewhat implicitly, that liberal government takes place through the agency of self-interested actors. Subjects are, as it were, asked to assume a different role. Unsurprisingly, this way of thinking has its roots in the second half of the 18th century. Foucault argued that what we call ‘homo aeconomicus’ started to be regarded ‘as the partner, the vis-à-vis, and the basic element of the new governmental reason formulated in the eighteenth century’ (2008, p. 271). Liberal governmentality is not reserved to state practices, but is acted out by individual subjects as well. Subjects are, in a sense, ‘self-producing’ (Binkley, 2009).

The notion that Foucault uncovered practices of the self does not imply that he finds no disciplinary power in neoliberal society. It is rather that it is more dispersed. Some commentators have argued that neoliberalism would involve minimal state interference (McNay, 2009). I would argue that the point is rather that the function of control changes, not that it diminishes. The distinction between two types of neoliberalism is helpful in this respect (Peck & Tickell, 2002). The 1980s are often characterised by a ‘rollback’ of public institutions, while the 1990s are known for a ‘rollout’ of new neoliberal institutions. The latter is more in line with Foucault’s line of reasoning. Particularly with respect to the way the homo aeconomicus was regarded in classical liberalism and neoliberalism, we can see how the thinking about control changed. In the 18th century:

> From the point of view of a theory of government, homo aeconomicus is the person who must be let alone. With regard to homo aeconomicus, one must laisser-faire, he is the subject or object of laissez-faire. And now, in Becker’s [neoliberal] definition [...] homo aeconomicus [...] appears precisely as someone manageable, someone who responds systematically to systematic modification artificially
introduced into the environment. *Homo economicus* is someone who is eminently governable’ (2008, p. 270).

I would argue that the classical liberal position of ‘spontaneous synthesis’ is replaced by what we may call ‘orchestrated synthesis’ in neoliberalism. This will become even clearer when this is connected to the focus on competition. For German neoliberals ‘competition is not the result of a natural interplay of appetites, instincts, behaviour, and so on. In reality, the effects of competition are due only to the essence that characterizes and constitutes it’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 120). In other words: if we want people to compete, we have to make them.

In a sense, neoliberal government can be called ‘governing by freedom’, albeit a rather particular, economised conception of freedom. Foucault articulated this most clearly by saying that, in neoliberalism, ‘control is no longer just the necessary counterweight to freedom, as in the case of panopticism: it becomes its mainspring’ (2008, p. 67). Foucault’s main argument seems to be that the point of control under panopticism was to protect society, or certain (elite) groups from the dangers that the freedom of others may impose (Foucault, 1978a). This is related to my earlier comment that there was still an assumption that there were domains in which government could interfere, and domains in which it couldn’t. Under neoliberalism – as a postpanoptical philosophy – by contrast, control is needed not to prohibit freedom, but particularly to assure freedom of all, in the sense of the earlier mentioned economic game. Both ways of thinking assume advantages to the exercise of control, but different ones. One of the core features that distinguishes 20th century forms of neoliberalism from classical liberalism is the idea that freedom is not a given. There is no invisible hand that will lead markets to equilibrium. Therefore, *laissez faire* types of governance will not do. Instead, when it comes to freedom, governments need to ‘manufacture it constantly, to arouse it and produce it’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 65). He states that ‘[l]iberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera’ (2008, p. 64).

When it comes to the subject, freedom should not be considered as a form of autonomy, as some authors do (McNay, 2009), nor is it antithetical to (state) power (Patton, 1989). In neoliberal thought, the distinction between public and private (Hamann, 2009), and the ‘citizen’ and the ‘economic subject’ is lost. Because the neoliberal subject is fundamentally staged, this form of governmentality no longer has an ‘outside’ (Read, 2009).
If the challenge of neoliberalism is indeed to stage a disciplinary subject, the question is how to make individuals adopt such a role. After all, neoliberalism is still a paradigm in which the ‘fear of the state’ is widespread. How can the notions of an active policy to shape individuals be combined with the principle of not interfering in their (economic) lives directly? How can governments monitor whether subjects indeed assume the role that they are expected to take? How can governments steer, while releasing discipline in the sense of directly interfering in people’s lives? How to make sure that resistance will be limited?

The line that I want to highlight in coping with this question is the change in thinking about the application of disciplinary techniques, again in the light of reciprocity. An early, pre-neoliberal (17th-18th century) example is what he calls the ‘paradox of the police’: ‘The police […] is what enables the state to increase its power and exert its strength to the full. On the other hand, the police has to keep the citizens happy – happiness being understood as survival, life, and improved living’ (1979, p. 251-252). Two aspects are important: first, it was still acceptable to interfere in citizens’ lives directly, and second, state power may increase if it keeps citizens happy. The police was there to prohibit the freedom of some in favour for the freedom of others. It was meant to control (potentially) criminal elements.

The notion that neoliberal thinking about reciprocity in the exertion of governmental power has clearly departed from contract-based forms can be seen in its reaction to what Foucault calls the ‘pacts of war’ that were proposed around WWII:

‘pacts in terms of which governments – basically the English, and to a certain extent the American government – said to people who had just been through a very serious economic and social crisis: Now we are asking you to get yourselves killed, but we promise you that when you have done this, you will keep your jobs until the end of your lives’ (2008, p. 216).

Neoliberal thinkers reacted strongly against such social-contractual setups that were the foundation of post-war welfare states. Foucault further develops the example of social insurance to explain how thinking about reciprocity in state intervention has changed. Rather than saying that society as a whole is asked to protect individuals against risks, as is the case in socialist thought, he argues that neoliberals claim that:
‘[s]ociety, or rather the economy, will merely be asked to see to it that every individual has sufficient income to be able, either directly and as an individual, or through the collective means of mutual benefit organizations, to insure himself against existing risks’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 144).

This refers to the model of the individual as a player, the primary decision-maker of an economic game, in which he functions as a micro-enterprise. The provision of basic social insurance is based on the idea of ensuring that no player drops out of the game, as to make sure that the settings for competition remain intact. Foucault claims that, in contrast to socialist conceptions of social security, the neoliberal paradigm is not to reduce ‘relative poverty’ – i.e. to change the relative gap between different incomes – but mere ‘absolute’ poverty, below a certain threshold. State intervention is not regarded as the enforcement of an agreement between individuals and the population to sustain principles like equality. Rather, it is meant to enforce the basic boundaries of economic life, which are expected to enable reciprocity.

Moving over to the American neoliberalism of the Chicago school, Foucault stresses the ‘strategic programming of individuals’ activity’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 223). This refers to the human capital theory that I discussed in the previous chapter already. By stressing the projection of individual enrichment, American neoliberalism justifies governmental intervention in education in order to argue for investment in the human capital of the ‘enterprise of the self’. Even though this signals direct intervention in individuals’ lives, it should be argued that this is presented as a mere change in boundary conditions. It is questionable, however, if there is such a thing as a ‘non-intervening condition’ (Dix, 2010). Considering the focus on ‘investment’ in the human enterprise, such interference of governments is accepted. Citizens get to further their personal entrepreneurship and governments receive productivity in return.

The last point I want to stress here is the change in thinking about the use of perception in applying governmental power in the mentioned reciprocal relations. Foucault’s argument is that individuals are made to believe that they get something in return for their role in society. First, in German Ordo-liberalism, there was an attempt to construct ‘a set of what could be called ‘warm’ moral and cultural values which are presented precisely as antithetical to the ‘cold’ mechanisms of competition’ (2008, p. 242). More importantly, Foucault regards security as a core concept (Tellmann, 2009) in reference to perception, one that was turned into a principle of calculation: ‘[t]he problem
of security is the protection of the collective interest against individual interests. Conversely, individual interests have to be protected against everything that could be seen as an encroachment of the collective interest’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 65). He claims that there is a mechanism to condition individuals to continuously experience the endangerment of their security position, which is what he calls a ‘culture of danger’. This notion of endangered security is used in neoliberalism as a justification for state intervention. By allowing government to play around with boundary conditions, you assure a certain level of security in your lives.

Possibilities of criticism and its limits

‘If individual autonomy is not the opposite of or limit to neoliberal governance, but rather lies at the heart of disciplinary control through responsible self-management, what are the possible grounds upon which political resistance can be based?’, as McNay (2009, p. 56) asks rightfully. The overview of neoliberal thinking on reciprocity that was given above is ambiguous, in the sense that it is emphasised, on the one hand, that citizens ought to experience benefit from their relation to the population and to government, but on the other hand, that this benefit might be indirect and non-exclusive.

Foucault proceeds to show the liberal argument for how individuals or the population can ‘claim’ their reciprocal relation. Referring to the internal limitation of government, Foucault formulates the neoliberal theorem that ‘a government that ignores this limitation will not be an illegitimate, usurping government [as was the case in the judicial model - WM], but simply a clumsy, inadequate government that does not do the proper thing’ (2008, p. 10). This implies that citizens who want to secure their position should no longer refer to their natural rights, but to the laws of political economy, in order to explain that government has not acted in their interest. Foucault explains this, albeit somewhat cryptically, by referring to the type of criticism that homo economicus might employ:

‘Homo economicus is someone who can say to the juridical sovereign [. . .]: You must not. But he does not say: You must not, because I have rights and you must not touch them. This is what the man of rights, homo juridicus, says [. . .] Homo economicus does not say this. He also tells the sovereign: You must not. But why must he not? You must not because you cannot. And you cannot in the sense
that ‘you are powerless.’ [..] You cannot because you do not know, and you do not know because you cannot know [..] [P]olitical economy has told the sovereign: Not even you can know the totality of the economic process. There is no sovereign in economics.’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 282-283).

What is most interesting in this respect is that we have seen before that citizens are purposefully kept in the dark about macro-level issues. Here we see that they are expected to function as a knowledgeable homo economicus when it comes to telling governments what not to do. And, equally importantly, government is also limited in its possibilities to know, and probably to set boundaries. Nevertheless, on the basis of the above, governments seem to be in a favourable position compared to citizens, when it comes to getting a grasp on reality. Particularly when we keep in mind that such governments apply mechanisms of perception to create warm values on the one hand, and a culture of danger on the other, there seems to be a good deal of purposeful ambiguity around the neoliberal subject, which implies certain limits to critical agency. This provides an interesting reflection on Mckee’s optimistic statement that ‘subjects are reflexive and can accommodate, adapt, contest or resist top-down endeavours to govern them if they so wish’ (2009b, p. 479). The question is to what extent this holds in a situation that is characterised by fundamental asymmetries.

The electronic health record

What I have tried to unfold in the first part of this chapter, is how subjectivation occurs in a number of expected reciprocal relations. One aspect that became apparent, is that the two distinct ‘subject types’ that I concluded the previous chapter with are re-conceptualised in these relations. In a sense, they are given a rationale. Ideas about reciprocity provide some sense of an argumentation of why people are expected to accept such roles. However, I have tried to indicate to what extent the role of control and perception plays a part in ‘staging’ this acceptance. In the remainder of the chapter, I apply this way of thinking to one example of a Dutch pro-innovation policy: the creation of an infrastructure for a national electronic health record.

Part of this section is taken from an earlier publication (Mensink & Birrer, 2010), the remains of this text are published in chapter four of this thesis
Information technology is generally a popular topic for a Foucauldian analysis (see e.g. Munro, 2000; Henman & Adler, 2003). Often, however, they focus exclusively on the possibilities for surveillance that it offers. Even though I believe this to be an important element, in this case, I show that technology can also illustrate questions of neoliberal subjectivity, and more specifically, reciprocity.

The first minister (liberal-democrat) who started the process of moving towards a national electronic health record argued to intend not to interfere in the sector directly (Ministerie van VWS, 1997), in proper neoliberal fashion. In 1999, however, this claim was found not realistic (TK, 2000/2001a); her successor (conservative-liberal) subsequently proceeded to set out clear lines for the development of this platform. Still, the electronic health record is regarded as a framework condition, or ‘infrastructure’, and particularly one that is supposed to re-arrange streams of information (see e.g. RVZ, 1996; 1998a; 2002a; Ministerie van VWS, 1997; TK, 2000/2001a; NICTIZ, 2002a). The assumption is that unequal access to information stands in the way of free competition (RVZ, 1996).

The idea of using data from Electronic Health Records goes back to the mid-1950s; since then it has gone through many stages of development. Bonnie Kaplan (1995) has shown how medical computing was linked to subsequent policies to develop a basic research infrastructure, to improve the access to and quality of care, and to achieve cost containment and prospective payments. After her article, however, Electronic Health Records entered a new stage of development, by being positioned as a tool for integrating (inter)national health systems.

In line with international trends, the Dutch debate around the formation of an Electronic Health Record with national coverage arose mid 1990s. Main actors in this respect have been the second chamber of parliament (here referred to by the Dutch term Tweede Kamer (TK)), subsequent ministers of health care, the Public Health Council (RVZ) and the National IT Institute for Healthcare (NICTIZ). Nonetheless, many more actors may be identified, including standardisation bodies, the standards themselves, medical journals, numerous individuals, researchers, research institutes, consultancies, etc. Where relevant, I attempt to highlight who acted where. The goal of this paper is not, however, to perform a process study of the manner in which the EHR discourse has unfolded.

Before starting the analysis, a few more introductory remarks about the way I use the script concept in this chapter. In chapter two, I discussed scripts in relation to artefacts that were devised in order to materialise par-
ticular measurements of the productivity of innovation. What I tried to show is attempts of policy-makers to inscribe a particular type of ‘desired behaviour’ of doctors and patients into certain tools and methods. In this chapter, I examine similar inscription attempts, but now in relation to efforts to make the electronic health record infrastructure ‘do’ something. What it has to do, is to enforce particular relations of reciprocity. This approach is rather common to the study of electronic health records and technical infrastructures in general (Hanseth & Monteiro, 1997; Hanseth et al., 2006; Lee & Oh, 2006; Sahay, 2003). As I said in the introduction to this chapter, this way of examining inscription is one-sided in different respects: it suggests social determinism, the notion of materialising discourses, and structuralist readings of infrastructures. The reason for adopting this approach despite this lack of sophistication is that it is very suitable for describing the type of thinking that is voiced in the political documents that constitute the electronic health record discussion. I.e. these criticisms could be applied to the views of numerous stakeholders that are involved. In following chapters, I ‘unpack’ this way of thinking about inscriptions and scripts. For now, however, a more sophisticated view would only make matters more complicated.

Reciprocity between individuals

In the previous chapter, I already highlighted that the relation between doctor and patient is fundamentally re-assessed in the innovation discussion. As we saw, a principle-agent relation was introduced. On the basis of the Foucauldian angle that I unfolded in this chapter, however, we can improve our understanding of this relation.

Following the Foucauldian analysis of neoliberalism, we would regard both care providers and receivers as entrepreneurs. Care receivers in particular would be regarded as ‘entrepreneurs of the self’. The policy discussion around the electronic health record never uses such a formulation. However, in the line of the role that we saw being attributed to the patient in the previous chapter, such a point of view seems to make sense. The patient is considered a party in the healthcare market, maximising its health advantage at minimal costs. Patient demand is supposed to set in motion a sense of ‘creative destruction’ in the supply of healthcare services. Innovative providers, offering high quality products or treatments, are expected to be selected. This way of reasoning can also be recognised in the Public Health Council’s From patient to consumer report (RVZ, 2003b). Nevertheless, we must not imagine a
passive consumer, in the sense of the traditional notion of a producer-driven 'consumer society'. The future healthcare consumers are more entrepreneurial than that.

In terms of the reciprocity discussion, this evokes the image of a mutually beneficial relation between a buyer and a seller of a service. As said, the stress is no longer on assessing reciprocity by the perception of the value of an object of exchange. Instead, the focus is on the benefits that a relation of competition would imply for both parties. For neoliberalism, however, it is not expected that a competitive attitude and proper circumstance for competition come naturally. The state needs to create a framework within which this can occur.

In case of the electronic health record, the prime motivator is to attempt to balance out the information asymmetry between doctor and patient. Even though the EHR discussion was restrictive at first, when it came to the access of the patient to his/her record. This gradually changed over the past decade, however, largely due to the advocacy of the Public Health Council. For now, care providers are regarded to have too much power over their care recipients. This makes it hard for patients to further their 'health entrepreneurship'. The notion of the 'entrepreneur of the self' is strongly echoed in the way health consumers are described as managers of their own health, and their own health information. If we consider this from the point of view of the 'script' of the electronic health record, we have to imagine that the record is programmed in such a way that the additional information that it will make available will trigger a different type of patient behaviour. This evokes the image of the 'principal subject' that I outlined before. However, now that we imagine the patient in a reciprocal relation with his/her care provider, this picture gains nuance. i.e. we have to imagine that both patient and doctor gain from their position as respectively principal and agent. By the addition of the electronic health record, the balance of power is expected to shift.

*Reciprocity between individual and population*

From the mid 1990s onward, different topical macro-problems have dominated the discourse on the necessity of restructuration, ranging from waiting lists (RVZ, 1996) and waiting times for getting medical treatment in the 1990s (TK, 2000/2001a), to the threat of the ageing population (Scheepbouwer, 2006) and medical mistakes as a result of poor information exchange in the previous decade (NICTIZ, 2003; TNS NIPO, 2003; 2004a; Ministerie van VWS, 2005e).
Cost reduction seems to be the prime challenge (TK, 1995/1996; RVZ, 1996; 1998a; TNS NIPO, 2004a), which is also echoed in academic studies (Walker et al., 2005).

There is a strong belief in the impact of entrepreneurial interactions between doctors and patients on issues at the level of public health, as it is argued in a report that advocates entrepreneurial consumerism for patients (RVZ, 2003a). We should keep in mind that this is largely based on the expectation of different ‘scripts’. In the previous chapter, I pointed at the inscription of measurement tools. With respect to the doctor-patient relation, the notion of ‘function-oriented description’ turned out to be the most relevant. In this chapter, we see a similar expectation of the electronic health record.

In an advice to government by the Public Health Council, entitled *Between market and government* (RVZ, 1998b), the council addresses the ‘paradox’ of the patient’s situation: ‘The tension between autonomy and dependency, between individual and general interest is translated as a tension between market and supply regulation’ (RVZ, 1998b, p. 3). The patient as a critical consumer was considered the most promising scenario to address macro-level issues. This reliance on individual interests to solve macro-level issues recalls the manner in which collective issues are thought to be solved by means of an ‘orchestrated synthesis’. All that is needed is to set the framework parameters right: on the basis of inscribing transparency and the right information, health consumers will hold their doctors accountable for bad work (RVZ, 2003a), and will rationally select insurances or hospitals that offer the best package in terms of cost and quality (RVZ, 1998a). Doctors will be more innovative, and more successful because of this. Similar expectations are acknowledged internationally as well (Gregory, 2000a).

The Public Health Council noted that the record could be used to calculate the chance that patients suffer from particular illnesses, which could in turn be used for calculating the cost effectiveness of particular treatments (RVZ, 2001). The notion that an EHR system ‘could be used for something’ implies that no concrete scripts have been developed for this. We could imagine, however, that there might be software packages that probe doctors to perform these types of measurements.

The same report mentions the earlier-mentioned Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY) calculation. A similar calculative mindset can be recognised in a report on the financial costs of medical information mistakes for society (TNS NIPO, 2004a). The health record is positioned as a tool to prohibit such costs. The ‘inscription’ that takes place here is very basic: by making doctors use computers, sloppy handwriting is omitted. Paper-based and electronic health
records are both technologies, but with different scripts. Paper makes doctors use a pen, whereas computers make them use the keyboard. This may sound trivial, but clearly, the expectations of this change in script are considerable. Here, we hear echoes of the other subject-type that I outlined before, the ‘human capital subject’. The logic is that by investing in an electronic health record, and prohibiting medical mistakes, we invest in people. This was the logic that I unfolded in the previous chapter. Given the additional framework of reciprocity, however, we may wonder what benefits individuals may receive from civil society ‘in return for’ the new role that they are expected to adopt. The basic logic seems to be that individuals will also benefit from solving macro-level problems: they wouldn’t need to wait for treatment as long, they would be warned earlier about epidemics, etc.

Reciprocity in between government and civil society

The notion of focusing on macro-level problems is strongly related to a conception of governing civil society. The EHR infrastructure ‘does’ more than merely connecting patients and doctors. It is also a tool for institutions that govern healthcare. The Public Health Council argue that ‘[t]he primary goal of the patient record is the support in care provision to the individual patient. Apart from that, it can serve for informing the patient, monitoring quality, business coordination, management support, research and statistics and education and policy’ (1996, p. 70). The council proposes to use the record to produce ‘ultimate strategic management information’. The use of such data for policy-making purposes is generally acknowledged (Henman & Adler, 2003; Jones et al., 2005). Macro-level applications that have been distinguished over the past decade are: the signalling of epidemics and large-scale poisoning (TK, 2000/2001a), automated administration (TK, 2007/2008b), benchmarking of the quality of care, scientific research, decision-support (RVZ, 2005b), replacing human labour (RVZ, 2002b), increased labour productivity (Ministerie van VWS, 2007a), transferring healthcare tasks to the patient (RVZ, 2002a), automated cost calculations and a generally healthier population and labour market (TNS NIPO, 2004a). Such expectations are also recognised in the literature (see e.g. Gregory, 2000a). Once data is made anonymous, patient privacy is thought to be an issue no longer, allowing information to be re-used for broader purposes. Generally, they make fairly clear that individual interests, such as privacy protection, should not outweigh general
interests, thereby relating exactly to what Foucault has named the ‘problem of security’ (Foucault, 2008, p. 65).

While individuals patients are needed to compile the data for addressing population-level problems, the same is true the other way around as well. Large datasets are suggested to be used to influence patients’ lives. The council refers to the capability of intelligent systems to recognise patterns in massive data sets, which can be applied to calculate averages, and to set norms (RVZ, 1996; 2005b). These norms can be used in physician’s decision-support systems, to give an automatic signal if a measurement exceeds such norms.

This brings the discussion to the question of how to set up this new framework for information provision exactly. Here, it is likely that concrete scripts are imagined. The formulation is not yet very precise, but the conception seems to be to develop systems in such a way that they make medical professionals gather data in a particular manner. First of all, the council points out that certain measures are required to enable population-level applications on top of individual ones, mainly when it comes to data processing. What they refer to as ‘classic obtaining of data’ – ‘putting in order, selecting, presenting, etc.’ (RVZ, 1996, p. 12) – is considered inadequate for this purpose. A future-proof system should be capable of data interpretation, which concerns ‘issues like knowledge systems, pattern recognition, etc.’ They stress that, ‘[u]p to recently, data interpretation was reserved for human intellectual capacities. New technologies enable that also information systems, be it to a restricted extent, are able to do this’ (RVZ, 1996, p. 12). Basically, they argue for structured input of data, i.e. not making use of free text fields, in order to allow for computerised analysis. Even though the then-minister acknowledged the need for free text fields for capturing the richness of the medical context, he argued for greater objectivity through structured input (TK, 2004/2005b). This discussion is still an issue in the ongoing ‘standards war’ between two camps that each favour a different approach to managing data storage and exchange between parts of the system (Eichelberg et al., 2005). This will largely be the practical angle for the next chapter. The suggestion of structuring information relates to the ‘globalizing and quantitative’ type of knowledge that Foucault (1982) describes as a necessity for governing populations. On the individual level, the public health council proposes the storage of information in the range of everything from diagnostic acts, ‘such as the making of a röntgen photo, up to a patient’s meal’ (RVZ, 1996, p. 86). The institute that is supposed to prepare the Dutch electronic health record has proposed to store patient information in natural language,
Blueprinting power relations. Planning the Electronic Health Record

and to translate this to coded data for secondary use (NICTIZ, 2002a). What is not yet clear, however, is how this is to be implemented. On the one hand, governments could simply create rules that tell medical staff which data is needed. However, it is also possible that software systems would be designed in such a way that it is the technologies that ‘make’ them do their work in a particular way. We could imagine that a doctor could not move on to the next screen of his/her EHR application, before completing all required data fields.

Secondly, the question of how to exchange data is a relevant point. From the mid-1990s onward, the idea of a personal chip card that would carry medical data was a serious option. However, the Public Health Council argued that:

'In using a patient-managed chip card, different data can only be linked on the basis of patient approval (in the form of physical presence of a chip card). This is of great importance for patient privacy, but for anonimised epidemiological research this is a major restriction, which can damage general interests’ (RVZ, 1996, p. 84).

An electronic health record with national coverage would not have these shortcomings.

Third, there is the question of what the proper unit is to ‘connect data to’. Also here, the Public Health Council advises an individualised setup in a collective arrangement: rather than storing data in relation to medical acts, data should be connected to the patient as (s)he is the ‘only constant factor’ (RVZ, 2005b, p. 5). Practically, this means to connect medical data to the so-called Citizen Service Number, which was previously judged to be inadequate from the point of view of privacy and fraud.

Reciprocity between government and individual

The informational letter and brochure that were sent to all adult citizens in November 2008 provides an interesting illustration of Foucault’s thinking on governmental techniques to stage the neoliberal patient. I mention a number of aspects particularly: (i) the brochure does not provide any information on the collective goals of the record, just on a few advantages for individual patients, (ii) the brochure conveys the ‘warm’ type of values that Foucault refers to when discussing German Ordoliberalism (Foucault, 2008, p. 242): using
the visually illustrated example of a typical Dutch woman, with a typical medical issue, the reader is shown a bright image of her future with the record, (iii) the message stresses that attention was paid to issues that might prohibit personal freedom, such as safety, ease of use and security, (iv) the brochure appeals to the feeling of threatened security in terms of the risk of medical errors, which could be overcome by using the record. Also the brochure seems to have been ‘inscribed’. This communication shows an attempt to construct a particular perception that should be seen in the light of a reciprocal power relation: citizens are asked to trust their data to be processed electronically, in return for a general feeling of security about their personal health.

*The limits to the critical patient*

This brings me to a final point: The letter offers citizens the possibility of denying the electronic processing of their health information. This brings us back to the ambiguous position concerning the type of criticism that neoliberal subjects may deploy. How should we interpret the possibility to refuse state interference in the light of this case, however? First of all, citizens are given an opt-out option: they are allowed to refuse the use of their data, instead of being asked to confirm this (opt-in). It is known that this approach lowers the degree of refusal. Up to March 2009, 438.000 citizens had in fact refused (NRC Handelsblad, 2010). Secondly, because of the creation of perceptions, the information that is provided to citizens to use as a basis for possible criticism is limited. A third, and more important element that I would like to raise, however, is that the letter to citizens could be regarded as a request to legitimise the introduction of a new framework for healthcare. Despite the serious macro-level implications, the request is made to individuals, which is in line with the assumptions of neoliberal thought. Because of the information asymmetry between government and these citizens, however, individu-
als are asked to commit to an implicit reciprocal relationship with the population of which they are part.

Governmentality scholars propose to focus on strategies of resistance (Mckee, 2009b), but these have been virtually nonexistent in the electronic health record case. The only relevant exception perhaps is a group of 800 concerned general practitioners (Committee Wake-Up) that, amongst other actions, participated in expert meetings organised by the Dutch senate (Mckee, 2009a). This, however, did not lead to any forms of resistance by citizens.

Discussion and conclusions

We left Part 1 with an understanding that reframing healthcare policy from the point of view of innovation implies a twofold subjectivation of the care receiver. On the one hand, (s)he is given the role of ‘principal’, which effectively implies to monitor the productivity of care providers. On the other hand, (s)he is subject to investment in ‘human capital’, being given a role in societal productivity. I tried to show that these different roles of the care receiver are expected to be ‘evocable’ by the scripts that are given to particular measuring tools and description systems. To put it simply: they are expected to make people do something in a particular way.

A practical lesson of this chapter as that both the same logic of reasoning and the same subject types can be recognised in the discussion about planning an electronic health record infrastructure, as in the general discussion about innovation in healthcare. Also the EHR is expected to carry certain scripts that would change behaviour of healthcare actors. First of all, giving more information to patient is expected to change their behaviour vis-à-vis their care providers. This adds up to the role of the patient as a ‘principal subject’. Secondly, the fact that health record-keeping will be done with a different technology – ‘computers instead of paper’ – also implies a change of scripts. Making doctors use computers is a material way of saying: ‘you are no longer allowed to use your sloppy handwriting’. There are other digital scripts that are expected to contribute to overcoming medical mistakes, which I will not discuss here. The point is that such scripts are expected to keep patients healthier and, therefore, more productive. This way, the electronic also contributes to constituting care receivers as subjects of productivity, or as ‘human capital subjects’, as I called it before. In reference to Foucault’s remarks on the neoliberal theory of human capital investment, I can
again remark that innovation is considered as an input for productivity increase, rather than as an output. By investing in a technological infrastructure, government expects the healthcare sector to adopt more innovations, which will reduce medical mistakes and make the population healthier.

The theoretical angle that I introduced here, however, allows us to go beyond the understanding that I unfolded after Part 1. The case of the electronic health record is not just important to show that the same principles apply as in the general discussion on innovation in healthcare politics. I have tried to make two theoretical advances in this chapter. First of all, I broadened Foucault’s second mode of subjectivation from the rather narrow notion of ‘dividing practices’ to the idea of subjectivation in power relations. This is not a big step compared to chapter one, in which power relations between doctors and patients were already implied. By providing a systematic overview of Foucault’s scattered remarks on reciprocity in political theory, however, this analysis gains substance.

I have tried to show that the different relations of reciprocity - between individuals, population and government – form a framework from which the basic subject-types that were identified in Part 1 can be better understood. To start with the most practical: neoliberal thinkers expect that constituting care receivers as ‘principal subject’ and as ‘human capital subject’ places them in reciprocal relations, respectively with care providers and the entire population. With respect to the former: both patient and doctor are expected to benefit from the entrepreneurial attitude that is attributed to them. In the latter relation, the reciprocity that is expected to arise is mostly ‘indirect’, in the sense that it cannot always be traced to a particular relation of ‘competitive exchange’. The individual and the population cannot exchange directly. The general logic seems to be that the individual also benefits from tackling population-level problems, by means of the data that they provide. A very specific example of a mutually beneficial individual-population relation – in the eyes of neoliberal politicians – is the processing of data for healthcare norms. Individual data is needed for generating information about health population(s). Vice versa, such generic information is expected to be usable as input for automated decision-support on individual patients.

Looking at reciprocity in more general terms, however, implies that the subjectivity of the care receiver is shaped by a number of relations. Suddenly, a patient is not just the ‘principal’ of his/her doctor and a cog in the wheel of the economy. In addition, (s)he is also a ‘competitive health entrepreneur’, a ‘member of civil society’, and ‘citizen of the Dutch state’. What is more, (s)he is expected to benefit from all the relations that these subject-types imply.
Neoliberalism provides a framework to reconsider the subjectivity of the patient. Yes, the twofold subjectivation that appeared in Part 1 still applies, but it is now embedded in a broader construct that we may call the ‘neoliberal subject’. For subsequent chapter, therefore, I shall use this notion as my point of orientation. In neoliberalism, the patient is considered as an overarching entity that combines a number of roles. The particular role that the subject acts out depends on the relation in which (s)he is engaged. These relations overlap. The subject is different and the same, at any given time.

Governments apply different techniques to assure that subjects do indeed assume these roles, without interfering in their lives directly. The ‘spontaneous synthesis’ that classical liberals expected to occur was transformed by ‘orchestrated synthesis’. One of the implications of this orchestration is that people are not necessarily aware of the different ways in which they are subjectified. Many of the relations that I discussed here are ‘side effects’ of individual relations in which the care receiver engages. This is also important from the point of view of resistance. Even though the neoliberal subject is considered capable of criticism, this is restricted by information asymmetries. As such, individuals might voice criticism in relation to their individual cases, but are unlikely to do so in relation to population-level issues of which they are unaware. This idea contradicts what some commentators assume (see e.g. Mckee, 2009b): the neoliberal subject may be free to say no, but is unlikely to do so, given the way (s)he is constituted. This applies to both individual and collective forms of resistance (McNay, 2009; Read, 2009). Individuals are ‘asked’ to commit to a policy instrument, of which they are incapable of judging many of its parameters, mainly those relating to macro-level goals.